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Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
United States Supreme Court:
State Law Indirect Purchaser
Claims Do Not Obstruct the
Purposes of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts

The United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of
whether section 4 of the Clayton
Act, which limits recovery under
the Sherman Act to direct purchasers, preempts state antitrust laws
which expressly allow indirect purchasers to recover damages for
overcharges. The Court stated that
federal law preempts state law (1) if
the federal law expressly provides
for preemption; (2) if Congress
intended to preempt state law in a
particular field; and (3) to the
extent that the state law obstructs
the objectives of the federal law.
However, when Congress legislates
in an area traditionally regulated
by the states, the Court will presume that Congress did not intend
to supersede the states' laws.
ARC did not claim that federal antitrust laws expressly
preempt state antitrust laws which
allow indirect purchasers to recover for damages, or that Congress impliedly preempted the area
of antitrust law. Rather, ARC
argued that the state antitrust laws
are preempted because they obstruct the broad purposes of federal antitrust law.
The Court initially noted that
states have traditionally regulated
the field of antitrust law, and that
Congress intended to supplement,
not displace, state antitrust laws
with federal antitrust laws. The
Court pointed out that on previous
occasions it had held that federal
antitrust laws did not preempt
state antitrust laws.
Furthermore, the Court determined that the court of appeals had
misunderstood Illinois Brick. The
IllinoisBrick Court did not address
whether and to what extent federal
antitrust law preempts state antitrust law. Instead, the Illinois Brick
Court merely interpreted section 4
of the Clayton Act to allow only
direct purchaser claims under the
federal antitrust laws.
The Court held that state indirect purchaser laws do not obstruct the three policy goals identiVolume 2, Number I/Fall, 1989

fled in Illinois Brick

-

avoiding

unnecessarily complicated litigation, providing direct purchasers
with incentives to bring private
antitrust actions, and avoiding
multiple liability of defendants.
First, state indirect purchaser
claims would not unnecessarily
complicate federal antitrust proceedings. Most state indirect purchaser claims would be brought in
state courts. Additionally, the federal courts may decline to hear the
state indirect purchaser claims if
the claims would complicate the
federal antitrust proceedings.
Therefore, the burden on the federal courts would be minimal.
Second, the indirect purchaser claims would not reduce the
direct purchasers' incentives to

bring antitrust actions by reducing
the amount that direct purchasers
could recover from a fund. In this
case the parties established the
settlement fund to dispose of all
claims, regardless of whether they
were state law claims or federal law
claims, or whether they were
brought by direct or indirect purchasers. "That direct purchasers
may have to share with indirect
purchasers is a function of the fact
and form of settlement rather than
the impermissible operation of
state indirect purchaser statutes."
488 U.S. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 1667.
Finally, the Court rejected
ARC's argument that the federal
antitrust laws preempt the state
aititnust

laws because the state

claims might subject violators to
multiple liability. The Court noted
that state laws are not ordinarily
preempted solely because they impose liability greater than that imposed under federal laws. Nor was
there evidence that Congress intended to preempt state law to
prevent defendants from being liable under both state and federal
law.
Marianne L. Simonini

Subpoena Power Of
Federal Home Loan
Bank Board Extends To
Records Of Bank
Customer Where
Neither Bank Nor
Customer Is The
Investigatory Target
In Sandsend Financial Consultants, Ltd. v. Federal Home Loan

Bank Board, 878 F.2d 875 (5th Cir.
1989), the Fifth Circuit held that
the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board ("FHLBB") may subpoena
a bank customer's records although neither the bank nor the
customer is directly associated
with the target of the FHLBB's
legitimate law enforcement inquiry. The court determined that a
subpoena may not be quashed
where the subpoenaed records are
relevant to the FHLBB's inquiry
and the FHLBB substantially complies with the Right to Financial
Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 34013422 (1988).
Overview of the FHLBB
The FHLBB acts as the "operating head" of the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation
("FSLIC"). The FHLBB examines
all FSLIC-insured establishments
to guarantee that they function
safely and comply with governing
laws and regulations. To enable the
FHLBB to accomplish its duties,
Congress granted the FHLBB
broad investigative authority. The
FHLBB's investigative powers are
specified in 12 U.S.C. §§
1730(m)(1)-(3) (1988). Section
1730(m)(2) gives the FHLBB the
power to garner "testimony under
oath as to any matter in respect of
the affairs or ownership of any
such institution or affiliate thereof,
and to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum..

,"l
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U.S.C. § 1730(m)(2).
The only judicial remedy for
bank customers who oppose a
FHLBB investigation is the Right
to Financial Privacy Act ("the
(continued on page 18)
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(from page 17)

Act"). Under the Act, the FHLBB
may not obtain a customer's financial records unless the records
sought are relevant to a legitimate
law enforcement inquiry and the
procedural requirements of the Act
are observed.
The Act's procedures require
the FHLBB to deliver a subpoena
for the financial records and a
notice of the right to challenge the
subpoena to the customer. If the
customer objects to the subpoena,
the customer must file a motion to
quash in federal district court. The
motion must include an affidavit
alleging either that the financial
records are irrelevant to the inquiry and the reasons supporting
the allegation, or that the agency
has not complied with the Act. 12
U.S.C. § 3410(a). If it finds the
customer's challenge to the subpoena is proper, the district court
must order the government to file a
response. If the government demonstrates that the records are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry, the court must deny
the motion to quash.
Factual History
The FHLBB examined the
records of Vision Banc Savings and
Loan ("Vision Banc") and discovered that Vision Banc had granted
four individual loans totalling
$20.4 million to four companies.
All four companies applied the
loan proceeds to purchase land
from the Walton Development
Corporation ("Walton"). Walton
then gave $2.5 million and a tract
of land to the Chairman of the
Board and majority stockholder of
Vision Banc. In addition, Walton
gave $7 million to Sandsend Financial Consultants, Ltd., ("Sandsend") which deposited the money
in the West Belt Bank ("West
Belt") and made several large withdrawals within days of this deposit.
These transactions led the FHLBB
to suspect that all four individual
loans were really one loan exceeding Vision Banc's lending limits
and that Sandsend was either defrauding Vision Banc or participating in a scheme to wrongfully use
18

the Vision Banc loans.
The FHLBB subpoenaed
Sandsend's financial records from
West Belt on June 20, 1989. On
July 8, Sandsend filed a motion to
quash the subpoena. The district
court granted Sandsend's motion.
However, in doing so, the court
neither allowed the FHLBB time to
reply to Sandsend's motion, nor
ordered the FHLBB to respond, as
the Act requires. In addition, the
court failed to hold a hearing or
render an opinion. The district
court denied the FHLBB's motion
for reconsideration of its ruling
and the FHLBB subsequently appealed.
Appellate Court Examines the
Scope of the FHLBB's
Investigatory Power
On appeal, Sandsend argued
that the FHLBB's investigatory
powers extend only to parties
under direct investigation (i.e., Vision Banc). In contrast, the
FHLBB argued that under the Act
its subpoena power extends to
Sandsend's records because they
are relevant to a legitimate agency
investigation.
The fifth circuit had not previously addressed whether the
FHLBB's subpoena power is limited to parties directly associated
with the target of an investigation.
The court applied two principles to
decide the issue. First, an administrative agency's broad investigative powers need only be supported
by a suspicion of unlawful conduct.
Second, the court's review of an
administrative subpoena is limited
to two questions: (1) whether the
agency's investigation is based on
an appropriate statutory purpose;
and (2) whether the subpoenaed
documents are relevant to the investigation.
Although Congress limited
the FHLBB's investigative authority to insured banks and their
affiliates, it provided the FHLBB
broad investigative tools. The
FHLBB's subpoena power is not
limited to any class of persons.
Thus, the court reasoned that the
subpoena power extends to any

person, provided that person has
information "as to any matter in
respect of the affairs or ownership"
of the institution or affiliation. 12
U.S.C. § 1730(m)(2). Therefore,
the FHLBB's investigative scope
includes parties such as Sandsend,
who are not necessarily associated
with the FHLBB's investigative
target.
The court noted that Congress
patterned Section 1730 on the investigative authority of national
bank examiners (12 U.S.C. § 481
(1988)) and FDIC examiners (12
U.S.C. § 1820(c) (1988)). A national bank examiner may "make a
thorough examination of all the
affairs of the bank and ... examine any of the officers and agents"
of a national bank. 12 U.S.C. § 48 1.
Sandsend argued that under Section 481, bank examiners may subpoena only bank officers and
agents. Thus, because Congress
modeled Section 1730 upon Section 481, the FHLBB's subpoena
power is similarly restricted.
The court rejected Sandsend's
argument and held that Section
481 limits only the class of people
that the national bank examiners
may examine, not the people it
may subpoena. Moreover, even if
Section 481 limits who the bank
examiners may subpoena, the language of Section 1730 does not
limit the FHLBB's subpoena
power to "officers and agents."
Instead, the court noted that
Section 1730 contains the same
language as Section 1820. The
FDIC has the power to subpoena
"any matter in respect of the affairs or ownership of any" insured
bank or affiliate. 12 U.S.C. §
1820(c). Both Sections 1730 and
1820 empower an agency to subpoena any party and any document
that relates to any matter of a
bank's affairs or ownership. Thus,
the court held that although Congress modeled Section 1730 after
Sections 481 and 1820, Congress
chose the more expansive language
of Section 1820 rather than the
restrictive language of Section 481.
Finally, Sandsend argued that
if the FHLBB can subpoena its
Volume 2, Number 1/Fall, 1989
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records the FHLBB can subpoena
the records of anyone who has any
contact with investigated loan proceeds. The court, however, found
that such an inquiry is proper if the
FHLBB suspects that the parties
under investigation are involved in
unlawful conduct.
Procedural and Substantive
Errors of the Lower Court
The court held that the district court failed to follow the Act's
procedures and denied the FHLBB
an opportunity to respond to Sandsend's motion to quash the subpoena. First, under the Act, if a
party moves to quash a subpoena,
the district court "shall order the
Government authority to file a
sworn response." 12 U.S.C. §
34 10(b). Thus the burden is placed
upon the district court to obtain
the government's response. By failing to demand a response from the
FHLBB, the district court
thwarted Congress' intent that the
FHLBB be heard before a court
quashes a subpoena. Additionally,
the district court had ruled before
the FHLBB's time to respond had
expired, thereby denying the
FHLBB its right to be heard.
While the court indicated that
the procedural errors would have
been sufficient grounds for remanding the case, the court also
addressed the district court's substantive errors. The court held that
Sandsend had failed to meet any of
the three bases for mmhing a
subpoena. First, it was undisputed
that the FHLBB's examination of
Vision Banc was a legitimate law
enforcement inquiry. Second,
Sandsend's records were relevant
to the FHLBB's inquiry. Although
Sandsend had only a tangential
relationship to the target of the
FHLBB investigation, Sandsend's
records were relevant because the
FHLBB suspected that Sandsend
was involved in unlawful activity.
Third, the FHLBB substantially
complied with the Act in serving
the subpoena. The court held that
even if the FHLBB did not technically comply with the service requirements, the FHLBB gave
Sandsend actual notice of the subpoena and, therefore, substantially
Volume 2, Number 1/Fall, 1989

complied with the Act's requirements. The court reversed the district court's judgment and directed
the district court to enforce the
FHLBB's subpena.
Sheila Hanley

Ninth Circuit
Meticulously Applies
Consumer Protection
Act To Protect
"Uninformed"
Consumers
In Jackson v. Grant, 876 F.2d

764 (9th Cir. 1989), the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that under California law no contractual loan obligation exists until both lender and
borrower are identified. Because
notice of the three day rescission
period required by the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (1988), was
provided when the borrower
agreed to be bound by the loan, but
not when the lender was finally
identified, the borrower could cancel the loan agreement three years
after it was entered into.
Background
!n !98!1, Ms. Edna Jackson
("Jackson") secured a $26,000
loan with a deed of trust on her
home. Jackson defaulted on her
mortgage payments, and Union
Home Loans ("Union"), a real
estate loan broker, initiated foreclosure proceedings in June of
1982. In January of 1983, Jackson
and Union agreed to refinance the
loan in order to avoid foreclosure.
On February 18, 1983, Jackson executed the following documents to secure the new loan:
Truth in Lending Act ("TILA")
Disclosure Statement, Mortgage
Loan Disclosure Statement, Summary of Loan Terms, Deed of
Trust, Promissory Note, and Notice of Right to Cancel. The Summary of Loan Terms indicated that

Union was not the lender, that the
lender was unknown at the time,
and that Union did not guarantee
that Jackson would receive the
loan she requested. The Promissory Note and the Deed of Trust
left the lender's name blank. The
Notice of Right to Cancel indicated that Jackson could cancel the
agreement until March 1, 1983.
Union, unable to find a
lender, informed Jackson on April
28, 1983, that it would provide the
loan from its own funds. The terms
of the loan under this new agreement were essentially the same as
previously agreed, except Jackson
was to pay an additional $700 to
delete credit life insurance from
the loan. Jackson agreed to the
changes and the parties closed the
loan on April 29, 1983, more than
one month after signing the original loan documents.
On February 7, 1986, nearly
three years later, Jackson notified
the assignees of the loan, Syd and
Belle G. Grant, that she was electing to cancel the loan agreement
pursuant to the TILA provisions.
Jackson sought to rescind the
transaction in the United States
District Court for the Northern
District of California three days
later.
District Court Proceedings
At trial, Jackson claimed that
the loan was consummated on
April 29, when Union agreed to
provide the loan, and that Union
failed to give her notice of her right
to rescind the loan agreement
within three business days after its
consummation. Jackson also alleged that Union had made insufficient payment schedule disclosures
in violation of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act ("the Act").
The district court held that the
loan was consummated on February 18, 1983, when Jackson agreed
to be bound by the loan, and
therefore Union had properly notified Jackson of her right to cancel
the loan. Therefore, the court denied Jackson's request to rescind
the loan agreement. The United
States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the trial
court's decision.
(continued on page 20)
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